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NOTES
MAPPING THE MORASS: APPLICATION OF SECTION 2 OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT TO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
In June, 1991, the United States Supreme Court decided two
major Voting Rights Act' cases: Chisom v. Roemer,2 a voting
rights challenge to Louisiana's system for electing state supreme
court justices, and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General,3
a similar challenge to Texas' system for electing trial court
judges. The issue presented to the Court in both cases was
whether section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which outlaws voter
dilution, is applicable to judicial elections. 4 The Supreme Court
determined that section 2 applies to both types of judicial elec-
tions: elections of supreme court justices who decide cases as a
panel5 and trial judges who act as sole decisionmakers. 6 These
decisions resolved a conflict between the Fifth and Sixth Circuits7
and laid to rest a statutory issue with which courts had wrestled
for years8
The finding that section 2 applies to judicial elections will
greatly facilitate voter dilution claims. The nonapplicability of
section 2 to judicial elections would have required minority plain-
tiffs challenging state judicial elections to meet the more bur-
densome intent standards of the Fourteenth9 and Fifteenth °
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, Title I, S 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. SS 1973-1973p (1988)).
2. 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
3. 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
4. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2358; Houston Lawyers' Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. at 2378.
5. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2358.
6. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. at 2380.
7. Compare Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that S 2 did cover
state judicial elections) with League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v.
Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (finding that S 2 did not cover state
judicial elections), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct.
2376 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Chisom v. Edwards, 659 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. La. 1987), rev'd and remanded,
839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988), subsequent proceeding,
Chisom v. Roemer, No. 86-4057, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 1989),
affd and remanded, 917 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
9. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-68 (1979).
10. Id. at 61-65; see infra note 39.
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Amendments. Under these intent standards, plaintiffs would pre-
vail only if they offered evidence sufficient to support a finding
that judicial districts were either designed or maintained to
discriminate against the racial minority." Because the Court has
now determined that section 2 applies to judicial elections, plain-
tiffs will be able to establish a violation by meeting the more
liberal "results" test of section 2.12 Under the results test, claim-
ants can succeed by showing that based on the totality of the
circumstances, a racial minority has not had the opportunity to
elect representatives of its choice.13
Chisom and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n will have significant impact
across the country. Most states elect judges at some level, 4 and
any electoral scheme that effectively dilutes minority votes may
be subject to challenge. Thus far, minority plaintiffs have brought
section 2 challenges to judicial election schemes in eleven states. 5
One state, Mississippi, had redesigned judicial districts to remedy
section 2 violations even before the recent Supreme Court de-
terminations. 6 Judicial districts in other challenged states, how-
11. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 626-27 (1982).
12. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 83-84 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
generally Andrew P. Miller & Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act: What is the Intent of the Results Test?, 36 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 (1987) (discussing impact
of the adoption of the results test).
13. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51. The Gingles opinion gives the following definition of
racial bloc voting: "Stated succinctly, a bloc voting majority must usually be able to
defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority
group." Id. at 48-49.
14. Thirty-eight states elect either appellate or general jurisdiction trial court judges.
Dixie K. Knoebel, The Voting Rights Act: Are Its Provisions Applicable to the Judiciary?,
13 STATE CT. J., Summer 1989, at 24, 26. The following states elect at least some of their
judges in multijudge, at-large elections: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Id. at 27; see also MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY- SELECTION,
COMPENSATION, ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 7-9 (1987) (distinguishing states that have partisan
elections from those that have nonpartisan elections). Still more states elect justices of
the peace and judges to courts of limited jurisdiction, such as family and probate courts.
Id. at 8, 24 n.72.
15. These states include Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, and Texas. See ABA JUDICIAL ADMIN. Div., STANDARDS RELATING TO
COURT ORGANIZATION 54 n.5 (1990). Plaintiffs filed suit in California and New Mexico after
the Supreme Court's determination in June, 1991, that S 2 applies to judicial elections.
Scott Armstrong, Minorities Seek More Clout on the Bench, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct.
1, 1991, at 1.
16. In Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Miss. 1987), the district court found
that eight of Mississippi's judicial districts violated S 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at
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ever, have remained in limbo, anticipating Supreme Court review.17
The event prompting Supreme Court review in 1991 was the
Fifth Circuit's finding in September of 1990 that section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act'8 did not apply to the election of state judges.
This en banc decision, in League of United Latin American Citi-
zens Council (LULAC) v. Clements,19 reversed the direction courts
had taken on the question of the applicability of section 2 to
judicial elections2 The decision not only ran counter to precedent
set in the Sixth Circuit2' but also overruled the Fifth Circuit's
own decision only two years earlier in Chisom v. Edwards.22 As
a result, LULAC was a controversial decision that presented a
compelling issue for Supreme Court review. State defendants
praised the decision as a triumph of local prerogatives.2 Civil
1204. The state did not appeal. In Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988),
the court ordered restructuring and special elections. As a result, more black trial judges
were elected in Mississippi than ever before. See Robert McDuff, The Voting Rights Act
and Judicial Elections Litigation: The Plaintiffs' Perspective, 73 JUDICATURE 82, 84 (1989).
17. In Louisiana, for example, the district court, bound by League of United Latin
American Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc),
rev.'d sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General, 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991), vacated
a prior injunction that prevented the state from holding judicial elections in districts found
to be in violation of S 2. Clark v. Roemer, 751 F. Supp. 586 (M.D. La. 1990) (order vacating
injunction), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2096 (1991). Two days later, the Supreme Court ordered a
stay of elections until the Court determined the issue on appeal. Clark v. Roemer, 111 S.
Ct. 376 (1990) (order granting, in part, appliqation for injunction and stay of order).
18. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act reads:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title,
as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on
the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading
to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsec-
tion (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one
circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. S 1973 (1988) (codified as amended).
19. 914 F.2d 620.
20. Id. at 652 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
21. See Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 1988).
22. 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988). In Chisom, the court found
5 2 applicable to state supreme court elections. Id. at 1058.
23. Ronald Smothers, Texas Way of Electing Judges Is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,
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rights groups, on the other hand, lambasted the decision as a
major setback.4 In scathing dissent, Judge Johnson described
the LULAC opinion as a "burning scar on the flesh of the Voting
Rights Act."25 "[T]he majority opinion is not simply wrong,"
warned Judge Johnson, "it is dangerous." 26
With the Supreme Court's decision in June, 1991, any such
dangers presented by LULAC have dissipated. Significant diffi-
culties, however, still lie ahead in devising a standard and an
appropriate remedy for Voting Rights Act violations in judicial
elections. The dilemma that courts will continue to face is how
to reconcile the goals of voting rights legislation with the special
characteristics of the judicial function. The solution to this di-
lemma has eluded lower courts in the past.2
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decisions in Chisom and
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n give the lower courts little guidance as
to the standard or the remedy in section 2 challenges to judicial
districts. In both opinions, the Court decided only the threshold
issue of statutory interpretation. The opinions do not address
how courts should determine whether a judicial scheme violates
section 2. In Chisom, Justice Stevens wrote: "[T]hat task, difficult
as it may prove to be, cannot justify a judicially created limitation
on the coverage of the broadly worded statute . . . ."28 In his
Chisom dissent, Justice Scalia accused the Court of "lead[ing] us
• ..with stubborn persistence-into this morass of unguided and
perhaps unguidable judicial interference in democratic elec-
tions."2
This Note supports the Supreme Court's determination that
section 2 applies to judicial elections. It heeds the dissent's
concern, however, that major incongruities exist in applying
1990, at 8. Renea Hicks, Texas' Deputy Attorney General, applauded the decision, stating,
"You just can't have Federal courts intervening in the way states reconfigure their
judicial systems." Id.
24. Id. Frank R. Parker of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
explained the decision as the result of "Nixon-Reagan-Bush conservative appointments to
the courts." Id.
25. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620,
652 (5th Cir. 1990) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers'
Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511, 543-
44 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (expressing "serious and deeply felt concerns about the difficulty in
fashioning an equitable remedy" to a S 2 violation in judicial elections). The court wrote
that "[a]ny remedy may only serve to further polarize the voting blocs which currently
exist, and will almost certainly result in the removal from the bench of a number of
decent, fair and competent state judges . . . .In remedying one injustice this court may,
in effect, be creating others." Id.
28. Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2368 (1991).
29. Id. at 2375 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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section 2 in the judicial context. The Note argues that these
incongruities emerge not from the statute itself but from the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute in the legislative
context in Thornburg v. Gingles.30 The Note contends that courts
should limit the Gingles standard3' to elected representative
bodies and should develop new criteria more appropriate to the
judicial context. Courts should adopt a revised section 2 test that
acknowledges the special characteristics of the judicial function.
In developing these arguments, the Note first traces the de-
velopment of voting rights law, focusing on the legislative objec-
tives of the 1982 amendment to section 2. Next, the Note addresses
the interests of state defendants, focusing on the concepts of
state autonomy and judicial independence and the extent to which
these represent compelling state concerns. The Note then pro-
poses a new threshold test that tailors the Gingles criteria to fit
the judicial context. This revised threshold test, combined with
a pure totality of the circumstances test, would serve the pur-
poses of the Voting Rights Act without compromising the judicial
function. Finally, the Note concludes that the historic deference
to state judicial election schemes and sensitive policy issues
justify applying a different and less intrusive voter dilution
standard to judicial elections.
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTIONS
OF SECTION 2
President Lyndon Johnson signed the original Voting Rights
Act into law in 1965,32 acclaiming its enactment as a "triumph
for freedom as huge as any victory that has ever been won on
any battlefield."' Since its passage, the Voting Rights Act has
been instrumental in curbing the most blatant forms of electoral
discrimination. It has forced the removal of literacy tests and
other formal barriers to voting and has made orchestrated
intimidation and harassment of minority voters the exception
30. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
31. For a discussion of the Gingles standard, see text accompanying notes 82-98, 278-
316.
32. Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act, PuB. PAPERS
840 (1965). Congress had passed other voting rights legislation prior to the 1965 Act. See
42 U.S.C. S 1971 (1964).
33. Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act, supra note
32, at 840.
34. U.S. COM'N ON CivIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 29
(1981).
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rather than the norm. 5 Today, the central battle for minority
voting rights is waged not over eliminating formal barriers to
participation but over guaranteeing full and equal access to the
electoral process. The wrong to be righted is that of voter
dilution. Voter dilution exists when a minority group represents
a sizable percentage of the population but is unable to elect its
preferred candidates in multimember, at-large elections because
the majority regularly votes along racial lines to defeat the racial
minority.36
Voter Dilution Before 1982
Today, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides the statu-
tory basis for voter dilution claims. Before its amendment in
1982, however, section 2 was a noncontroversial37 and largely
superfluous provision38 Its text paralleled the language of the
Fifteenth Amendment39 and outlawed any "standard, practice, or
procedure" applied "to deny or abridge the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color."40 Courts
found section 2 protections to be coequal with Fifteenth Amend-
35. See Don Edwards, The Voting Rights Act of 1965 as Amended, in THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 3, 3-5 (Lorn S. Foster ed., 1985). Abuses persist,
however. In 1981, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported incidents of harassment
of minority voters, misuse of absentee ballots, and the strategic location of polls to
discourage black voters. Id. at 29-37. For more recent charges of voter manipulation in
North Carolina, see Michael Isikoff, Justice Dept. Investigates GOP Mailing to Voters,
WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1990, at A6.
36. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-49 (1986).
37. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980).
38. Frank R. Parker, The 'Results' Test of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act:
Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 727-28 (1983).
39. The Fifteenth Amendment reads as follows:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
40. 42 U.S.C. S 1973 (1975), amended by 42 U.S.C. S 1973 (1982) (current version at 42
U.S.C. S 1973 (1988)). Before its amendment in 1982, S 2 of the Voting Rights Act read:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in
section 1973b(f)(2) of this title.
Id.; see supra note 18.
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ment guarantees. 41 Before the amendment of section 2 in 1982,
minority plaintiffs generally brought voter dilution claims under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42
Initially, however, plaintiffs had little success winning voter
dilution claims at the Supreme Court level. The three voter
dilution cases reaching the Supreme Court before 1973, Fortsen
v. Dorsey,43 Burns v. Richardson,44 and Whitcomb v. Chavis,45
challenged at-large electoral districts, at least in part because
they discriminated impermissibly against minority voters. The
Court rejected each of these claims for failure to prove invidious
discrimination.46 To prove a constitutional violation, the Court
required a showing that the electoral system was either "con-
ceived or operated" with discriminatory intent.47 Dicta in each of
these cases, however, suggested that in a different factual situ-
ation the Court might accept a showing of discriminatory effects
as evidence of a Fourteenth Amendment violation.48
Not until 1973, however, did plaintiffs succeed in a racial voter
dilution claim at the Supreme Court level.49 In White v. Regestere°
the Court found that multimember, at-large districts in two Texas
counties impermissibly diluted the voting strength of blacks and
Mexican-Americans. The Court held that the plaintiff's burden of
proof in a racial voter dilution claim was
to produce evidence to support findings that the political proc-
esses leading to nomination and election were not equally open
to participation by the group in question-that its members
had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of
their choice. 51
The Court's opinion in White neither mentioned nor inquired into
the subjective intent of Texas state officials. The holding rested
41. E.g., Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60-61; see also Parker, supra note 38, at 727-28 (suggesting
that lower courts deciding S 2 claims preferred to rely on constitutional standards because
the constitutional case law was more developed and therefore provided more solid footing
for their decisions).
42. See Parker, supra note 38, at 718.
43. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
44. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
45. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
46. Id. at 149-50; Burns, 384 U.S. at 88-89; Fortson, 379 U.S. at 438-39.
47. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149.
48. Id.; Burns, 384 U.S. at 88-89; Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439.
49. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-67 (1973).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 766.
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on a "totality of the circumstances ' 2 test; these circumstances
included not only electoral impact but also "cultural and economic
realities."'  The Court upheld the district court finding of illegal
voter dilution as "a blend of history and intensely local appraisal
of the design and impact of the . ..multimember district. 54
City of Mobile v. Bolden: The Intent Standard
In 1980, the Supreme Court in City of Mobile v. Bolden15
narrowed the White v. Regester16 "totality of the circumstances"
test.5 7 In Bolden,. the Court required evidence of discriminatory
intent to establish an Equal Protection Clause violation in voting
rights cases.58 The Court held that the plaintiffs in Bolden lacked
sufficient evidence to show Mobile's at-large system of electing
three city commissioners had been purposefully designed or main-
tained to discriminate against black voters.5 9 The facts of Bolden
were compelling. African-American plaintiffs from Mobile,
Alabama, charged that they did not have an opportunity to elect
the candidates of their choice because at-large voting for a three-
person city commission allowed the white majority to vote as a
block to defeat black candidates. 60 Statistics supported the plain-
tiffs' claim: although blacks comprised thirty-five percent of
Mobile's population, no black had ever been elected to the city
commission. 61 The Supreme Court, however, found that the plain-
tiffs' Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims failed because
they had not proven discriminatory intent.62 One reason for the
52. Id. at 769.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 769-70.
55. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
56. 412 U.S. 755.
57. Although Bolden was predicated on the Fifteenth Amendment, it interpreted White
as stating that "legislative apportionments could violate the Fourteenth Amendment if
their purpose were invidiously to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or
ethnic minorities." Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
58. Id. In 1976, the Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), established that
in order for a law to violate the Equal 'Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
its "invidious quality . . . claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced
to a racially discriminatory purpose." Id. at 240.
59. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 70. On remand, the trial court found sufficient evidence of
discriminatory intent and ordered redistricting of Mobile's electoral scheme. Bolden v.
City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1077 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
60. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 58.
61. Id. at 97-98 (White, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 74.
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difficulty the plaintiffs encountered was that the city commission
had been established in 1911, a time when literacy tests and
poll taxes effectively disenfranchised blacks in Alabama. The
irony of the Court's result was inescapable. Even though racism
was the factor that prevented blacks from voting in 1911, the
fact that blacks could not vote at the time the at-large system
was established provided a defense that the electoral system was
not designed with a discriminatory purpose.
Critics feared that Bolden had closed all avenues for minority
plaintiffs.6 4 In his dissent, Justice White called the intent require-
ment "flatly inconsistent" with White.65 The Senate Committee
on the Judiciary in 1982 labeled Bolden a "radical departure"
from both Supreme Court and lower court precedent.6 6 Civil
rights activists were more outspoken. Bolden's attempt to rec-
oncile the apparent inconsistency with the White standard was
so unsatisfactory that it prompted one commentator to label the
Bolden decision an example of "'legal double think.' "67
63. Bolden, 542 F. Supp. at 1064.
64. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 203-04 (noting that Bolden had placed "an acceptably difficult burden on plaintiffs"
and that as a result, plaintiffs had "virtually stopped filing new voting dilution cases").
65. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 94 (White, J., dissenting).
66. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 64, at 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 193.
67. Richard L. Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution: The Concept and the Court, in THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS, supra note 35, at 13, 33 (quoting
Bernard Grofman, Alternatives to Single-Member Plurality Districts: Legal and Empirical
Issues, 9 POLICY STUDIES J. 875, 880 (1980-81)). Two years after Bolden, Justice White had
the last word, authoring the majority opinion in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982),
the Supreme Court's last constitutionally based voter dilution decision. The Court may
have timed its release of the Rogers opinion so as not to intrude on congressional
decisionmaking, handing down its decision just days after Congress passed the 1982
amendment to § 2. Robert Barnes, Comment, Vote Dilution, Discriminatory Results, and
Proportional Representation: What is the Appropriate Remedy for a Violation of Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1229 n.130 (1985). In Rogers, the Court
held that facts very similar to those in Bolden were sufficient to support a finding of
discriminatory intent. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 627; Barnes, supra, at 1229-30 n.130. Rogers
reconciled the White "totality of the circumstances test" and the Bolden intent standard
by stating that the circumstantial evidence outlined in White may be sufficient to support
an inference of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Buchanan v. City of Jackson, 708 F.2d
1066, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982); see Barnes, supra, at 1229-30 n.130. Had the Court delivered
its opinion just a few days earlier, the Rogers decision would have rendered the hotly
debated amended S 2 "largely superfluous." Id. at 1231 n.130. Because of congressional
action amending § 2, the Rogers decision had little impact. Id. If, however, the Supreme
Court had decided that the § 2 amendments did not apply to judicial elections, the Rogers
interpretation of the constitutional standard would have assumed new significance because
it "now represents the Constitutional standard for discriminatory vote dilution." Id. at
1231 n.130.
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The 1982 Amendment to Section 2: The Statutory "Effects" Test
In response to the Supreme Court's holding in City of Mobile
v. Bolden,6s the House of Representatives passed an amended
section 2 which facilitated the plaintiff's burden of proof in voter
dilution claims by prescribing that discriminatory intent was not
necessary to prove a voting rights violation.69 Surprisingly, this
"results test" sparked little debate in the House and sailed
through by a vote of 389 to 2C70 The results test, however, met
greater resistance in the Senate.71 The Reagan administration
and several key Republican senators opposed the amendment as
one that "could well lead on to the use of quotas in the electoral
process. '72 After months of debate, Senator Robert Dole, an
original sponsor of the Senate version of the bill, proposed an
amendment that resolved the impasse.7 3 The so-called Dole
Compromise74 inserted language into section 2 that mirrored the
test advocated by the Supreme Court in White v. Regester.75 The
amendment made two significant changes to the language in
White. In place of the White term "legislators," Congress used
the more inclusive term "representatives.."76  Additionally, the
68. 446 U.S. 55.
69. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 64, at 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 179; see
James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose
vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 689-701 (1983);
Parker, supra note 38, at 747-50. For a detailed legislative history, see Thomas M. Boyd
& Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative
History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347 (1983).
70. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 64, at 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 180.
71. See generally Boyd & Markham, supra note 69, at 1379-425 (detailing the path to
Senate approval).
72. Comments of Assistant Att'y Gen. Bradford Reynolds, S. REP. No. 417, supra note
64, at 141, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 313.
73. Id- at 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 180; Boyd & Markham, supra note 69,
at 1414-15; Parker, supra note 38, at 748-49.
74. Parker, supra note 38, at 748. The Dole proposal stated that:
A violation of [section 2] is established if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination
or election ... are not equally open . . . in that [minorities] have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
S. REP. No. 417, supra note 64, at 95, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 268.
75. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). For a discussion of the adoption of the White test by the
Senate, see League of United Latin American Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914
F.2d 620, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers Ass'n v.
Attorney General, 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991) and S. REP. No. 417, supra note 64, at 2, reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 179.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988); LULAC, 914 F.2d at 624-25.
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amendment included a proviso stating that "nothing in this sec-
tion establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. '77
The Senate Report that accompanied the 1982 Voting Rights
Act Amendments stated that Congress' intent in amending sec-
tion 2 was to "restore the legal standard that governed voting
discrimination cases prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Bolden."78 Borrowing from factors first described in White and
outlined in the Fifth Circuit's decision Zimmer v. McKeith,79 the
Senate Report listed typical factors to consider in determining a
Voting Rights Act violation.80 The focus of inquiry was to be on
these objective factors, rather than on the subjective intent of
policymakers. 81
77. 42 U.S.C. 5 1973(b).
78. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 64, at 15, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 192.
79. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affd on other grounds sub. nom. East Carroll
Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
80. The Senate Report stated that amended § 2 codifies the White test. S. REP. No.
417, supra note 64, at 28, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205. The Report listed the
following factors to consider in determining whether, based on a totality of the circum-
stances, an electoral system impermissibly dilutes minority votes:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provi-
sions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the oppor-
tunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the
minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as
education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected
to public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of
plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected
officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure
is tenuous.
Id. at 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07.
81. Congress gave three primary reasons for rejecting the intent standard-that it
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Thornburg v. Gingles: The Court's Interpretation of Section 2
In December, 1986, four years after the amended section 2
became law, the Supreme Court, in Thornburg v. Gingles, 2 broadly
interpreted section 2 and considerably facilitated voter dilution
claims.83 Members of the Court issued four separate opinions,8
each agreeing that aspects of North Carolina's 1982 legislative
redistricting plan violated amended section 2 but diverging as to
the reasoning. A majority of the Court established a three-part
threshold for establishing a violation of amended section 2.85 The
three-part threshold required a minority group to demonstrate
only: (1) that it is sufficiently large and compact to create a
majority in a single-member district; (2) that it is politically
cohesive; and (3) that the majority votes as a sufficient block to
defeat minority preferred candidates absent special circum-
stances.86 In short, the Gingles criteria effectively eliminated
intent as a factor and focused in large part on the feasibility of
the remedy, establishing that when election results are dispro-
portionate and voting is racially polarized, plaintiffs can state a
voter dilution claim as long as demographics allow for single-
member minority districts.
Concurring in the result, Justice O'Connor criticized the Gingles
majority for "disregard[ing] the balance struck by Congress in
amending 5 2.'' 17 O'Connor objected to the Gingles analysis pri-
marily because it abandoned the totality of the circumstances
test outlined in White and codified in the 1982 amendment to
section 2.8 The White line of cases used a "multi-factor analysis"
was divisive because it required charging policymakers with racism, that it placed "an
inordinately heavy burden" of proof on plaintiffs, and that it "ask[ed] the wrong questions."
Id. at 36, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 214.
82. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
83. Miller & Packman, supra note 12, at 3. For a more polemic view, see ABIGAIL
THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS
193 (1987) ("The trickle [of S 2 cases] has turned out to be a flood, and minority plaintiffs
almost always prevail . . . . Plaintiffs, in fact, usually prevail even before the trial has
begun, since jurisdictions faced with politically costly and financially draining litigation
are generally quick to settle out of court.").
84. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 33.
85. Id. at 48-51. Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens formed the
majority. Id. at 33.
86. Id. at 50-51.
87. Id. at 85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id. at 83.
88. Id. at 94-95, 100-01; see also Miller & Packman, supra note 12, at 70 (discussing
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion). For a discussion of the White totality of the
circumstances test, see supra notes 49-54.
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in which election results and racially polarized voting were only
two of many factors to consider: they were essential, though not
sufficient to establish a Voting Rights Act violation.8 9 O'Connor
stated that the Court's opinion required localities to design elec-
toral systems that would "maximize feasible minority electoral
success." 90 This, she stated, amounted to "an entitlement to
roughly proportional representation within the framework of
single-member districts"'" and extended the reach of section 2
beyond congressional intent. In so doing, it altered the congres-
sional agreement significantly and paid little credence to the
proviso in amended section 2 that "nothing in this section estab-
lishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population."9 2
This result in Gingles appears to be at odds with the congres-
sional compromise that allowed for the results test of amended
section 2.91 The Gingles criteria have in fact facilitated voter
dilution claims considerably, perhaps more than Congress antic-
ipated. One critic of Gingles has observed that the Court's inter-
pretation has made section 2 claims "exceedingly hard to lose. '94
In the first four years after the passage of the amended section,
the minority success rate in voter dilution cases decided by the
courts surpassed ninety percent.9 5 In addition, many more local-
ities anxious to avoid costly litigation settled cases out of court.96
The 1990 census and improved redistricting software are certain
to add to plaintiffs' successes in the next decade.9 7
The purpose of this Note is not to debate the merits of the
Gingles criteria but to ask whether these same criteria should
89. Miller & Packman, supra note 12, at 74.
90. Ging/es, 478 U.S. at 89.
91. Id.
92. 42 U.S.C. S 1973(b) (1988).
93. Miller & Packman, supra note 12, at 74.
94. THERNSTROM, supra note 83, at 193. For a response, see generally FRANK R. PARKER,
BLACK VOTES COUNT 192-97 (1990).
95. THERNSTROM, supra note 83, at 228.
96. Id. at 229.
97. The Commonwealth of Virginia is a case in point. Of 29 voting rights cases filed
in Virginia since 1965, plaintiffs have prevailed in 26, with one case withdrawn and two
still pending. Most of these were settled out of court. The ACLU of Virginia estimates
in 1991, based on computer analysis of 1990 census figures, that 58 small towns, 15 cities,
and 29 counties in the state are vulnerable to voter dilution claims. Kent Willis, Director
of the ACLU of Virginia, urged localities to redistrict voluntarily to avoid suit, warning
that "[looking at the history, [localities] will more than likely lose." Overton McGee &
Susan Winlecki, Localities are Warned by ACLU, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 20,
1991, at Al, A3.
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apply to judicial elections. Two members of the Fifth Circuit in
the LULAC panel decision transparently expressed hostility to
Gingles, writing that "[flew would quarrel with the assertion that
Section 2(b) as interpreted [by the Supreme Court in Gingles] has
worked a fundamental change in the Act, highly intrusive to the
states."98 Such comments imply that the Fifth Circuit's reluctance
to apply section 2 to the judicial context stemmed from the
Gingles interpretation rather than the statute itself. Before ad-
dressing that issue, however, this Note explores the statutory
question and the policy implications involved in the applicability
of section 2 to judicial elections.
THE STATUTORY QUESTION: DECIPHERING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
In 1991, the Supreme Court chose to hear argument in two
cases, one from Louisiana and one from Texas, each raising a
different nuance to the question of whether the results test of
amended section 2 applies to state judicial elections. The Louisiana
case, Chisom v. Roemer,99 raised the issue of whether justices
elected to the state supreme court are subject to the Voting
Rights Act. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General °° asked
the same question regarding state trial court judges.
Chisom v. Roemer
In Chisom v. Roemer,'0 a class of registered African-American
voters from Orleans Parish, Louisiana, claimed that the design
of districts for electing state supreme court justices violated the
Voting Rights Act by impermissibly diluting minority votes.
02
At the time the United States Supreme Court decided the case,
seven justices served on the high bench in Louisiana. Of these
seven, five were elected from single-member districts spread
throughout the state. The remaining two justices were chosen
from one multimember district, termed the First Supreme Court
District, which consisted of four parishes in the New Orleans
98. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 902 F.2d 293,
301 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 914 F.2d 620 (1990) (en banc), and rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers'
Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
99. 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
100. 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
101. 111 S. Ct. 2354.
102. Id. at 2358.
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area, including Orleans Parish. Over half of the registered voters
in the district were African-American.10 3 In the other three par-
ishes, three-fourths of the registered voters were white. 104 Peti-
tioners in Chisom argued that the multimember districting in the
New Orleans area diluted the impact of minority votes in Orleans
Parish. 105 As a remedy, petitioners requested that the First
Supreme Court District be divided into two single-member dis-
tricts, one consisting of Orleans Parish and the other consisting
of the remaining three parishes.10 These two single-member
districts would have roughly the same population. 07
At first blush, the facts of the Louisiana case seem to present
the best possible factual scenario for applying section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act to judicial elections. Despite the state's large
black population, no black had ever been elected to the Louisiana
high court.' 8 The blacks of Orleans Parish constituted a large,
geographically compact minority group,10 9 as required under the
Ging/es criteria."10 Additionally, the state electoral system of
electing most supreme court justices from single-member districts
suggested that the state had no significant interest in maintaining
a multimember district in the New Orleans area. Perhaps most
importantly, the facts themselves suggested a simple remedy
that would neither compromise the goals of the existing system
nor lead to gerrymandering to serve the needs of minority voters:
dividing the First Supreme Court District into two single-member
districts.
Despite the apparent simplicity of the facts in Chisom, its road
to the Supreme Court hearing was far from smooth. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dis-
missed the plaintiffs' complaint, agreeing with the state that the
results test of section 2 did not apply to judicial elections"' and
that the plaintiffs' complaint did not state a constitutional viola-
103. Id. The other three parishes were St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2359.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 2358.
110. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986). Members of the Louisiana Supreme
Court sit as a group in most decisions, and therefore the single-member office holder
exception could not apply. For a discussion of the single-member office holder exception,
see infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
111. Chisom v. Edwards, 659 F. Supp. 183, 187 (E.D. La. 1987), rev'd and remanded,
839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988), subsequent proceeding,
Chisom v. Roemer, No. 86-4057, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816 (ED. La. Sept. 13, 1989),
affid and remanded, 917 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1990), and rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
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tion, because the plaintiffs had not alleged an intent to discrim-
inate. 112 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, finding
section 2 applicable to judicial elections."2 When the case was
remanded, however, the district court found that despite the
applicability of section 2, the evidence in Chisom was insufficient
to establish a violation under the Gingles standard."14 The plain-
tiffs appealed this ruling, but while the appeal was pending, the
Fifth Circuit, in its en bane rehearing of LULAC,"5 explicitly
overruled its prior decision in Chisom and held that Congress
did not intend for amended section 2 to cover voter dilution
claims in judicial elections. 16 As a result, the Fifth Circuit di-
rected the district court to dismiss the case." 7
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General
Unlike Chisom, the facts of Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney
General"8 do not easily suggest a remedy. The Texas judicial
scheme is a patchwork of electoral districts, each of which elects
several trial court judges. These districts vary significantly both
in the size of the population and the number of judges elected."9
If the Fifth Circuit, on remand from the Supreme Court, should
affirm the earlier finding that the Texas state system in the
challenged counties violates section 2, the only feasible remedy
would be an overhaul of the entire judicial electoral system "from
top to bottom."' 20 For this reason, and because the case involved
trial judges rather than supreme court justices, Houston Lawyers'
Ass'n presented a more complex factual scenario for the appli-
cation of section 2.
In 1988, the League of United Latin American Citizens, a state
coalition of mainly Hispanic and African-American residents, first
112. Id. at 189.
113. Chisom, 839 F.2d at 1063-64.
114. Chisom v. Roemer, No. 86-4057, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816, at *43-44. The
district court held against the plaintiffs because it found insufficient evidence of racially
polarized voting. See infra note 317.
115. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620
(5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd sub nora. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111
S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
116. Id. at 624.
117. Chisom v. Roemer, 917 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
118. 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
119. The county election schemes challenged in LULAC, for example, ranged from
Harris County, which elects 59 trial court judges at-large, to Midland County, which
elects only three. Id. at 2379.
120. James C. Harrington, Taking Liberties, TEXAS LAW., July 15, 1991, at 17.
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challenged the countywide judicial election systems in all Texas
counties, claiming that countywide, multijudge elections imper-
missibly diluted minority voting strength. 121 Plaintiffs based their
claim on section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and on the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments. The United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas found against the plaintiffs on the
constitutional claim, indicating that the claimants had not pro-
duced evidence sufficient to show discriminatory intent.122 On the
Voting Rights Act claim, however, the district court found a
violation and gave the Texas legislature less than three months
to fashion a remedy.'2
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit panel accepted the district court's
ruling that judicial elections were subject to section 2 but found
that trial court judges, who make decisions independently rather
than as a collective body, are excluded by the judicially created
"9single office holder exception."' 24 In a rehearing en bane, the
majority of the Fifth Circuit never reached the single office
holder question because it rejected outright the applicability of
section 2 to judicial elections.125 Writing for the Fifth Circuit
majority, Judge Gee asked whether by amending section 2 Con-
gress had intended to "subject the selection of state judges to
the same test as that for representative political offices. ' ' 26 He
responded that "for the cardinal reason that judges need not be
elected at all-we conclude that it did not."' 2'
The Fifth Circuit panel in LULAC and Judge Higginbotham in
his concurring opinion in the Fifth Circuit's en bane ruling, argued
121. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. at 2378-79. The scope of the challenge was
later narrowed to only 10 Texas counties. The Houston Lawyers Association, intervenors
in the case at the Supreme Court level, is an organization of African-American attorneys
from one of the challenged counties. Id.
122. See id. at 2379-80 (the U.S. district court issued an unpublished decision).
123. Id.; Jeri Clausing, Appeals Court Upholds Countywide Judicial Elections, UPI, Sept.
28, 1990. When the legislature failed to agree on a remedy and the court ordered
nonpartisan elections, the state decided to appeal the decision. Id.
124. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 902 F.2d 293,
308 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane), and rev'd sub nom. Houston
Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991). The source of the "single office
holder" exception is Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985), in which the
Second Circuit found that at-large, primary runoff elections for mayor, city council
president, and comptroller did not violate § 2. Id. at 143. The rationale behind the single
office holder exception is that a single office cannot be divided. For example, plaintiffs
could not succeed claiming voter dilution in a gubernatorial election because a governor
is a single office holder and by definition elected at-large.
125. LULAC, 914 F.2d at 622.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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that section 2 does not apply to trial court judges because of the
single office holder exception.1' The Fifth Circuit panel concluded
that trial judges are not "members of a multi-member body"'2
and stated that because "'the full authority of [the trial judge's]
office is exercised exclusively by one individual' "130 that "there
is no such thing as a 'share' of a single-member office.' 131
By granting certiorari in Houston Lawyers' Ass'n as well as in
Chisom, the U.S. Supreme Court prepared to address not only
the applicability of section 2 to state judicial elections but also
the issue of whether trial court judges who act as sole decision-
makers should be exempt from coverage of section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act because of the single office holder exception.
The Supreme Court in Houston Lawyers' Ass'n declined to adopt
the single office holder exception in judicial elections. Had the
Court adopted Judge Higginbotham's invocation of the single
office holder exception, its decision would have significantly lim-
ited the reach of the Voting Rights Act in the judicial context.
Instead, the Court's decision rejected the single office holder as
a blanket exception to Voting Rights Act coverage of judicial
elections but stated that such considerations are relevant either
to the factual determination of whether a violation has occurred
or in the design of a remedy.13 2 The Court determined, however,
that such concerns were not relevant to the threshold question
of statutory application. 33
The Supreme Court's Rejection of the Fifth Circuit's Arguments
in LULAC
The LULAC en banc majority based its statutory holding
primarily on three considerations: (1) that the terms "represen-
tative" and "judge" are mutually exclusive; (2) that the one-
person, one-vote cases indicate that judicial elections are subject
to different standards; and (3) that federalism concerns impede
an application of section 2 to judicial elections without a clear
statement of congressional intent.13 4
128. LULAC, 902 F.2d at 303-08; LULAC, 914 F.2d at 649-51.
129. LULAC, 914 F.2d at 648.
130. Id. (quoting Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511,
518 (M.D. Ala. 1989)).
131. Id. at 649 (quoting Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 1985)).
132. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376, 2380 (1991).
133. Id.
134. See LULAC, 914 F.2d at 623-30.
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The "Representative" Argument in LULAC
The Fifth Circuit's en banc opinion in LULAC rested on the
view that the terms "representative" and "judge" are mutually
exclusive.1 5 The court reasoned that if Congress had intended to
include judicial elections under section 2, it would not have chosen
the term "representative."136 The court maintained that the word
"representative" was a carefully chosen term of art.13 7 The opinion
cited fifteen published federal court decisions decided prior to
1982 to illustrate that the "settled legal meaning" of the term
representatives excluded judges.1s "Dim or no," wrote the ma-
jority of the Fifth Circuit, the use of the term representative "is
the only light available to guide our footsteps.' 3 9
In Chisom v. Roemer,40 however, the Supreme Court refused
to read the word representatives as a limiting term.141 According
to a majority of the Court, the word "representatives" refers to
"winners of representative, popular elections" 42-a definition of
the term that necessarily includes elected judges. The majority
of the Supreme Court also found the representative argument at
odds with both the liberalizing thrust of the 1982 amendment to
section 2 and its legislative history.43 The Court recognized that
section 2 undoubtedly did provide coverage for judicial elections
before its amendment in 1982.144 It reasoned, therefore, that if
Congress had intended to limit the scope of section 2 in any way,
it would have made this intent explicit in the language of the
statute or at least would have referred to this intent in the
legislative history.4 5
135. Id. at 628-29.
136. Id. at 628.
137. Id. To bolster its contention, the court pointed to the fact that amended 5 2
changed only one word from the White holding, replacing "legislator" with the term
"representative." Id.
138. Id. at 626 n.9. For example, the majority cited Wells v. Edwards, a Fifth Circuit
one-person, one-vote case affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court, which states:
"Judges do not represent people, they serve people." Id. at 627 (citing Wells v. Edwards,
347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), affd mem., 409 U.S. 1095 (1973)).
139. Id. at 631 n.15.
140. 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
141. Id. at 2366.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2362. Until its amendment in 1982, the protections of S 2 were held to be
coextensive with the Fifteenth Amendment. Id.
145. Id. at 2364 & n.23. Justice Stevens wrote that congressional silence could "be
likened to the dog that did not bark," a reference to a Sherlock Holmes tale in which
the telling clue was the fact that a watchdog had not barked in the night. Id. at 2364
n.23.
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Key to the Court's rejection of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
was the majority's view that amended section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act does not create two separate rights: one covering
voter dilution claims and the other covering claims of limited
access. 146 Given this premise, were the Court to hold that amended
section 2 did not apply to voter dilution claims in judicial elec-
tions, it would also have to hold that the statute did not cover
challenges to judicial elections claiming such barriers to partici-
pation as limited voting hours or voting sites located so as to
discourage minority voters.147 Justice Scalia in his dissent, which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined, interpreted
section 2 as creating two rights. 48 In Scalia's view, judicial
elections are covered by the "to elect" provision, but not by the
"to participate" provision. 49 Justice Stevens disagreed, writing
that the Court had no authority to bifurcate the single claim
Congress had created, "[e]ven if the wisdom of Solomon would
support the LULAC majority's proposal."' 50
The "One-person, One-vote" Argument in LULAC
The Fifth Circuit majority in LULAC exhibited a two-fold
reliance upon the one-person, one-vote argument. First, it bol-
stered the "representative" argument by indicating a line of
cases that at the time of the 1982 amendment held that judges
146. See id. at 2364-65.
147. Id. at 2365.
148. Id. at 2370-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. Scalia wrote:
The Court feels compelled to reach [its] implausible conclusion of a "singular
right" because the "to participate" clause and the "to elect" clause are joined
by the conjunction "and." It is unclear to me why the rules of English usage
required that conclusion here, any more than they do in the case of the
First Amendment-which reads "Congress shall make no law... abridging
• .. the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."
Id. at 2371.
150. Id. at 2365-66. Facilitating the Court's decision was its determination in Clark v.
Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2096 (1991), that S 5, requiring preclearance with the Department of
Justice before existing electoral districts can be altered, is fully applicable to judicial
elections. Id. at 2101-03. As Justice Stevens wrote in Chisom:
If Section 2 did not apply to judicial elections, a State covered by Section 5
would be precluded from implementing a new voting procedure having
discriminatory effects with respect to judicial elections, whereas a similarly
discriminatory system already in place could not be challenged under Section
2. It is unlikely that Congress intended such an anomalous result.
111 S. Ct. at 2367.
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were not representatives. 1 1 Second, the one-person, one-vote ar-
gument supported the position that judicial elections have been
and should continue to be subject to different criteria than
legislative elections. In arguing this latter view, the Fifth Circuit
majority maintained that the one-person, one-vote cases "leado
inexorably to the conclusion that judicial elections cannot be
attacked along lines that their processes result in unintentional
dilution of the voting strength of minority members.'1 52
The source of the one-person, one-vote doctrine is the case of
Reynolds v. Sims,'5 the progeny of Baker v. Carr's"4 foray into
"the political thicket."'155 Reynolds found a right in the Equal
Protection Clause to have one's vote accorded equal weight as
the votes of citizens in other parts of the state. 55 "The [vote],"
wrote Chief Justice Warren for the majority, is "preservative of
other basic civil and political rights."'157 The majority in Reynolds
reasoned that because "legislatures are responsible for enacting
laws by which all citizens are bound to be governed, they should
be bodies which are collectively responsive to the popular will."''
Legislatures can be responsive to the community as a whole only
if each vote is approximately equal to every other vote. A
constitutional elective system, therefore, must ensure that each
legislator represents a roughly equivalent number of voters. If
this were not the case, the votes of citizens living in certain
parts of the state were said to be "in a substantial fashion
diluted." 1 9
When plaintiffs used the one-person, one-vote guarantee to
challenge the design of judicial districts, courts determined that
the rationale for the constitutional protection did not apply to
judicial elections. In the first such case, Buchanan v. Rhodes, 60
plaintiffs challenged Ohio's judicial election scheme that permit-
151. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
152. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620,
627 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd sub nora. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen.,
111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
153. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
154. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
155. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 556 n.30, 566. Justice Frankfurter was one of the first to
use the term "political thicket" in reference to reapportionment. See Colgrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
156. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.
157. Id. at 561-62.
158. Id. at 565.
159. Id. at 568.
160. 249 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ohio 1966), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 839 (1968).
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ted at least one judge per county. Plaintiffs claimed discrimina-
tion because heavily populated counties were allocated the same
number of judges as lightly populated counties. The court dis-
missed the claim as a nonjusticiable political question and rec-
onciled Reynolds by stating that "[j]udges do not represent people,
they serve people. They must, therefore, be conveniently located
to those people whom they serve."'161 Cases that followed Buch-
anan similarly found that the one-person, one-vote principle did
not require the allocation of state judges on the basis of popu-
lation.162 In 1973, the Supreme Court affirmed this position in
Wells v. Edwards.6 3
The majority of the Fifth Circuit in LULAC reasoned that the
one-person, one-vote guarantee "underlies the concept of minority
vote dilution"' 64 and that if the former principle does not apply
to judicial elections, then neither does the latter. Following a
"settled canon of construction," the majority presumed that Con-
gress was aware of this judicial history and would have believed
judicial elections invulnerable to voter dilution claims.165 In his
dissent, Justice Scalia agreed with the Fifth Circuit majority.16
He called the extension of voter dilution guarantees into an area
not previously subject to the one-person, one-vote requirement
"a significant change in the law,"' 67 and one that the Court should
adopt only if Congress signaled this change with unmistakable
language.168 Scalia expressed his concern that if the one-person,
one-vote standard is eliminated, no basis would exist from which
to judge whether voter dilution has in fact occurred. 69 He chal-
lenged the petitioners in oral argument stating, "You need a
standard. How do you know what watered beer is unless you
know what beer is?"17°
161. 249 F. Supp. at 865.
162. Gilday v. Board of Elections, 472 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1972); Buchanan v. Gilligan,
349 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972),
affjd mem., 409 U.S. 1095 (1973); Holshouser v. Scott, 335 F. Supp. 928 (M.D.N.C. 1971),
aff'd, 409 U.S. 807 (1972); New York State Ass'n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F.
Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
163. 409 U.S. 1095 (1973).
164. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620,
628 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd sub noa. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen.,
111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
165. Id. at 628.
166. Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2369 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Houston
Lawyers' Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. at 2382 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2374 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2375.
169. Id.
170. Walter Borges, Lively LULAC Arguments Don't Signal Court's Intent, No Unity
on Either Side as Eight Justices Join In, TEXAS LAw., Apr. 29, 1991, at 1.
1272 [Vol. 33:1251
1992] THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
The majority opinions of the Supreme Court in Chisom and
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n, however, make only passing mention of
the one-person, one-vote concern. The opinion in Chisom distin-
guished Wells v. Edwards'17 which was based on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on the
Voting Rights Act. Because the purpose of the Voting Rights
Act is to grant protection beyond that guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, the majority found the Wells analogy unpersuasive. 1'7 2
Another weakness in the one-person, one-vote reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit majority in LULAC is that none of the one-person,
one-vote cases cited by the court involved racial discrimination.
When the basis of plaintiffs' challenge to judicial elections was
court delays and clogged dockets, courts historically either dis-
missed the case or accepted a rational basis for the state system;
administrative convenience was a sufficient rationale to overcome
a one-person, one-vote challenge to judicial elections' 73 Earlier
courts had suggested, however, that a showing by plaintiffs of
"arbitrary and capricious or invidious action" on the part of state
governments would compel a court to intervene in judicial elec-
tions.17 4
In 1980, the Fifth Circuit applied this reasoning in Voter
Information Project, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, in which it found
racial discrimination in judicial elections 7 5 Voter Information
Project challenged at-large elections for city and state judges in
Louisiana. Although blacks comprised twenty-five percent of the
population of the relevant area, no black judge had ever been
elected. 76 In its Voter Information Project decision, the Fifth
Circuit explained that the one-person, one-vote cases "make clear
that they do not involve claims of xace discrimination.' ' 77 The
Fifth Circuit went on to state that "[tjo hold that a system
171. 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), affjd mem., 409 U.S. 1095 (1973).
172. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2368.
173. See, e.g., Holshouser v. Scott, 335 F. Supp. 928, 933 (M.D.N.C. 1971) (finding that
the one-person, one-vote rule does not apply to the state judiciary), aff'd, 409 U.S. 807
(1972). For a discussion of the one-person, one-vote cases rejecting application of the
doctrine to judicial elections, see Edward A. Sheridan, The Equal-Population Principle:
Does It Apply to Elected Judges?, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 316, 320-26 (1971).
174. Wells, 347 F. Supp. at 455; Holshouser, 335 F. Supp. at 933; see also Andrew S.
Marovitz, Casting a Meaningful Ballot: Applying One-Person, One-Vote to Judicial Elections
Involving Racial Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 1193, 1196 (1989) (arguing that if racial
discrimination exists, closer scrutiny is warranted).
175. 612 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1980).
176. Id. at 210.
177. Id. at 211.
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designed to dilute the voting strength of black citizens and
prevent the election of blacks as Judges is immune from attack
would be to ignore both the language and purpose of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments."'1 8
In City of Mobile v. Bolden,'7 9 the Supreme Court applied an
analysis similar to the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Voter Infor-
mation Project. Countering a contention by the dissent that the
one-person, one-vote and minority voter dilution claims had the
same analytical roots,180 the majority in Bolden held that the one-
person, one-vote argument does not even apply in at-large dis-
tricts. 8' Thus, the LULAC majority's one-person, one-vote, rea-
soning failed to persuade because one-person, one-vote and
minority voter dilution claims are subject to different criteria.
Presuming, as did the Fifth Circuit majority in LULAC, that in
1982, Congress was aware of the judicial history, the Supreme
Court reasoned that Congress also would have understood that
the immunity of judicial election systems from one-person, one-
vote claims did not indicate that judicial elections would be
insulated from charges of racial discrimination.
The "Federalism" Argument in LULAC
State defendants in LULAC appealed to the principle of
federalism 182 to argue that section 2 cannot apply to the state
judiciary.18 3 States did not challenge congressional authority to
legislate regarding state judicial elections. The Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments clearly grant Congress the power to usurp
state prerogatives in order to counter racial discrimination.&
The states however, argued that the judicial function is "unique"'185
178. Id. at 211.
179. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
180. Id. at 116 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 77-79.
182. "The true 'essence' of federalism is that the States as States have legitimate
interests which the National Government is bound to respect even though its laws are
supreme." Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
183. Brief for State Respondents at *10-11, 15-17, Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney
Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991) (Nos. 90-813 & 90-974) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
184. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, S 5. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment states: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2.
185. Supplemental Brief for State Defendants-Appellants at 8, League of United Latin
Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (No.
90-8014), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 2376.
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and had been traditionally insulated from federal intervention.186
In order to alter that traditional hands-off policy, Congress must
clearly and unequivocally express its intent to do So. 187 In Houston
Lawyers' Ass'n, the State of Texas argued that the requirement
of a heightened statement of congressional intent "seems strong-
est when the federal statute might work fundamental institutional
changes in the judicial function."188
The federalism argument, however, did not convince the mem-
bers of the Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor, the chief defender
of the concept of state autonomy on the Court,189 joined the
majority opinion in Chisom.90 Similarly, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist,
and Kennedy refused to employ the state autonomy argument in
their dissent. 91 The majority of the Court, however, did indicate
in Houston Lawyers' Ass'n that the state interest should be a
factor for courts to consider in determining whether violations
have occurred and what remedies should be granted.' 92
THE POLICY QUESTION: WEIGHING THE STATE INTEREST
The problem sparking these section 2 challenges to judicial
elections is that judicial election systems that demand majority
voting in at-large elections tend to dilute the voting strength of
186. Id. at 5.
187. Id. at 6 (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (holding that anti-
injunction statute 28 U.S.C. S 2283 is not an absolute bar to federal court injunctions of
state proceedings) and Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (holding
that Congress must explicitly state an intention to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity before federal courts hold states liable)).
188. Id. at 8.
189. See M. David Gelfand & Keith Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on
a "Conservative" Court: Currents and Cross-Currents from Justices O'Connor and Scalia,
64 TUL. L. REV. 1443, 1449-51 (1990); see also supra note 182 and accompanying text
(containing Justice O'Connor's definition of federalism).
190. See Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2357 (1991).
191. See id at 2369-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The absence of the federalism argument
from the Supreme Court opinion is perhaps not surprising considering that restricting
its own authority by deciding cases on the basis of state authority is against the interests
of the Court. The same day the Court decided Chisom. and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n,
however, it also issued Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991), one of the strongest
states rights decisions since 1976. Marcia Coyle, The Justices Rule on Judges, NAT'L L.J.,
July 1, 1991, at 1. In Gregory, the Court determined that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1988), does not cover state judges because the
plain meaning of the statute does not make clear "to anyone reading the Act that it
covers judges." Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2404. Justice O'Connor, who joined the majority
in Chisom and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n, authored the opinion in Gregory. See id.
- 192. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376, 2381 (1991).
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minority voters. 193 As a result, relatively few minority judges
have reached state benches through popular elections. A 1985
study indicated that of 7544 judges elected to serve on major
state courts, only 238 were African-American. 194 Overall, regard-
less of the election process, 3.7% of the judges on appellate and
general jurisdiction trial courts were African-American, 1.3%
were Hispanic, and .3% were Pacific Islander/Asian. 95 Still fewer
of these minority judges occupy seats on the highest state courts.
In Louisiana, for example, no African-American has been elected
to the state supreme court in the twentieth century, despite the
fact that almost thirty percent of the state's population is black.
196
Similarly, a 1986 study showed that ten of fifteen states that
elect judges to serve on their highest courts had no blacks sitting
on the high bench.'97 The application of section 2 to judicial
elections should correct this trend and have the salutory effect
of bringing more minorities onto state courts.
State defendants, however, have cautioned against an applica-
tion of section 2 to the judiciary. The states have claimed a
193. See, e.g, Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982).
At-large voting schemes and multimember districts tend to minimize the
voting strength of minority groups by permitting the political majority to
elect all representatives of the district. A distinct minority . . . may be
unable to elect any representatives in an at-large election, yet may be able
to elect several representatives if the political unit is divided into single-
member districts.
Id. For a less critical view of multimember, at-large districts, see Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 157-60 (1971).
194. FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, INC., THE SUCCESS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN
ACHIEVING JUDICIAL OFFICE: THE SELECTION PROCESS 18-19 (1985) [hereinafter FUND FOR
MODERN COURTS]. More black judges serve on courts of limited jurisdiction. A 1986 study
found 421 black judges serving nationwide on state courts of limited jurisdiction. Unfor-
tunately, the study did not include figures on the total number of state judges serving
on these courts. See Barbara L. Graham, Judicial Recruitment and Racial Diversity on
State Courts: An Overview, 74 JUDICATURE 28, 30 (1990). Executive and legislative appoint-
ment schemes have been somewhat more successful than elections in bringing minority
judges to the bench. FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, supra, at 20-21.
195. See FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, supra note 194, at 18-21.
196. Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285, 290 (M.D. La. 1988). One black, Jessie Stone,
did serve by appointment for 17 days on the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1979. Id.
197. Graham, supra note 194, at 35. In 1986, no blacks sat on the highest state courts
in 30 states, including ten that elect judges: Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. One black justice
sat on the high bench in each of the following states: Alabama, California, Florida,
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
and Virginia. Id. For a breakdown of state courts and how judges at each level are
selected, see CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS AND THE NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1988, at 179-235 (1990).
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significant interest in designing their own judicial election
schemes 98 and have argued that the traditional remedy for sec-
tion 2 violations- dividing at-large districts to create smaller,
single-member districts with a predominately minority popula-
tion-offends common assumptions of judicial independence and
impartiality. 199 The states' concern has been that if judges are
called "representatives" and are elected like representatives,
they would tend to act more like politicians than judges, ruling
on disputes with a bias in favor of constituents.20 State defen-
dants therefore argued that the statutory issue extended beyond
defining the structure of state elections to defining the function
of the state judge.201
The Fifth Circuit majority in LULAC agreed with the state
defendants and stated that the intrusiveness of section 2 in
judicial elections "strikes at federalism's jugular."202 Chief Judge
Charles Clark in his concurrence agreed, stating that "[t]he State
of Texas has a strong interest and, indeed, a fundamental right
to choose to have these judges elected in the manner provided
here. '20 3 This section explores broadly the nature of the state
interest in judicial independence and discusses specifically the
states' interest in maintaining multimember judicial districts.
The States' Interest in Judicial Independence
The principle of judicial independence is as old as the nation
itself.20 4 It encompasses two aspects central to the judicial func-
tion: the institutional independence of the judiciary from the
198. Brief for State Respondents at *28-29, Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen.,
111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991) (Nos. 90-813 & 90-974) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
199. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914 F.2d
620, 664, 668-69 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Johnson, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Houston
Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
200. Id. at 668-69.
201. See Supplemental Brief for State Defendants-Appellants at 13-14, LULAC, 914 F.2d
at 620 (No. 90-8014).
202. LULAC, 914 F.2d at 630.
203. Id. at 632 (Clark, J., concurring).
204. See generally COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 14, at 3-4 (noting that the
independent judiciary was a key reform accompanying the American Revolution). The
Declaration of Independence lists as one grievance that judges were "'dependent on [the
King's] will alone, for the tenure of his offices, and the amount and payment of their
salaries.'" THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776), quoted in COMISKY &
PATTERSON, supra note 14, at 3. The Founding Fathers, however, did not trust the
electorate to select qualified judges. COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 14, at 3-4.
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executive and legislative branches25 and the insulation of deci-
sionmaking from pressure by the political majority.26 The appli-
cation of section 2 does not threaten the first of these aspects
of judicial independence. It could, however, intrude upon the
second aspect-the independence of judicial decisionmaking. 2'07
This second meaning of judicial independence emphasizes the
countermajoritarian role of the courts.208 As expressed by the
Fifth Circuit majority in LULAC, "public opinion [is] irrelevant
to the judge's role," and the judge's task is "to disregard or even
to defy that opinion, rather than to represent or carry it out.2
209
Lawyers for the State of Louisiana presented the same idea more
colorfully when they stated, "'Judges have but one constituency,
the blindfolded lady with the scales and sword.' "210
Competing with the principle of judicial independence, how-
ever, is a similarly powerful strain in American thought, that of
judicial accountability.21' The principle of judicial accountability
traces its origin to the era of Jacksonian democracy.212 With the
sweep toward universal male suffrage, egalitarianism, and the
popular participation in government that characterized the
Jacksonian era, the state judge appointed for life became a
symbol of aristocratic control.213 Motivated by this new Jacksonian
style of American democracy, state after state jettisoned ap-
pointed judgeships and opened the judiciary to popular elec-
205. "[T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative
and the executive." MARY L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE L. LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION:
THE CROSS EVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES 21 (1988) (quoting CHARLES
D. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Thomas Nugent ed., 1966) (1748)).
206. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 43-44 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
207. See comments by lawyers for the State of Louisiana, infra note 210 and accom-
panying text.
208. For a discussion of the countermajoritarian role of the judiciary, see ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
16-23 (1962); Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L. REV. 273
(1989).
209. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620,
622 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen.,
111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
210. Ruth Marcus, Supreme Court to Determine if Judge's Elections Are Biased; Minor-
ities Challenge Voting Rights Act Provision. WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1991, at A2 (quoting
lawyers for Louisiana Gov. Roemer).
211. PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 28 (1980).
212. VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 205, at 85, 88-92.
213. Id. at 89-90.
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tions.24 Characteristically, frontier states were particularly prone
to trust judicial selection to the common man.215 In fact, from
1845 to 1958, every new state in the union provided for a
popularly elected judiciary.216
This new popular accountability, however, created problems of
its own. Along with democratization came pork-barrel politics;
along with judicial accountability came judicial corruption.217 In
response, progressive reformers in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century urged a return to an independent state judi-
ciary.2 8 During this era, some elective states reverted to an
appointive selection system. Virginia, for example, abandoned
popular judicial elections and returned to a legislative appoint-
ment scheme.2 9 Other states retained judicial elections but insti-
tuted a nonpartisan rather than partisan election scheme. 0 Still
other states instituted a hybrid of elective and appointive sys-
tems.221 In short, each state sought its own balance between
judicial independence and judicial accountability. 222
214. Id. at 75-76.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 76.
217. See COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 14, at 4.
218. Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability:
The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 345, 348-50.
219. Today, Virginia retains a legislative appointment scheme for the selection of state
judges. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. Rhode Island and South Carolina are the only other states
that leave judicial selection to the state legislature. R.I. CONST. art. 10, §5 4, 5; S.C.
CONST. art. V, % 3, 9, 14. The legislative selection schemes have been criticized for failing
to bring a sufficient number of female judges to the bench. See, e.g., Women Attorneys
Call for Merit Judicial Selection Plan, 1 VA. LAW. WKLY. 797 (Apr. 20, 1987). Some have
found legislative appointment schemes, however, to be more effective in providing access
for black judges. Barbara L. Graham, Do Judicial Selection Systems Matter?, 18 AM. POL.
Q. 316, 333 (1990) (empirical study finding that legislative and gubernatorial appointment
systems are more effective than electoral selection schemes in bringing black judges to
the state trial bench).
220. COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 14, at 4.
221. Id. (discussing the adoption of merit selection schemes combined with retention
elections). For an overview of merit selection and retention elections, see id. at 10-18.
222. The process of striking a satisfactory balance between judicial independence and
judicial accountability continues. See, e.g., William M. Pearson & David S. Castle, Alter-
native Judicial Selection Devices: An Analysis of Texas Judges' Attitudes, 73 JUDICATURE
34 (1989). Much of the recent debate has centered around the benefits of merit selection
plans and retention elections. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative
Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995 (1988); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections
and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2007 (1988).
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Striking this balance requires one to make assumptions about
the nature of law and the judicial function.m For example, one
whose model of the judge's role is that of the administrator of
neutral principles,224 the "technician," 2 5 or the "moral expert,"
'' 6
will stress the need for judicial independence and will advocate
selection systems most likely to achieve that end.m On the other
hand, one whose judicial model is that of the policymaker applying
community values at the limits of the law2 28 is more likely to
advocate democratic selection.2 The more pragmatic view, of
course, is that the individual judge wears different hats, playing
the role of policymaker in one case and that of technician or
neutral logician in another. A proper state judicial selection
scheme strives to achieve a delicate equilibrium between the
judge as expert and the judge as purveyor of community values.
The States' Interest in Multimember Districts
The application of section 2 to judicial elections arguably would
compromise this balance between judicial independence and ju-
dicial accountability. Opponents of section 2's application to ju-
dicial elections have claimed that multimember judicial election
districts are essential to the fair, efficient, and impartial admin-
istration of justice.20 Opponents also have argued that judicial
electoral districts must "extend over a wide enough area . . . to
223. Michael H. Shapiro, Introduction: Judicial Selection and the Design of Clumsy
Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1555, 1555-57 (1988).
224. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
225. DUBOIS, supra note 211, at 22-23 (quoting Judge W. St. John Garwood, Democracy
and the Popular Election of Judges: An Argument, 16 Sw. L.J. 216, 229 (1962)).
226. Shapiro, supra note 223, at 1557.
227. See, e.g., DUBOIS, supra note 211, at 22-23.
228. See BENJAMIN J. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-141 (1921).
If you ask how [the judge] is to know when one interest outweighs another,
I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets
it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself...
No doubt the limits of the judge are narrower. He legislates only between
gaps. He fills the open spaces of the law.
Id. at 113.
229. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1717, 1731-32 (1988); see also DUBOIS, supra note 211, at 23-24 (reviewing the debate
between proponents of judicial independence and proponents of judicial accountability).
230. Supplemental Brief for Appellant Defendant-Intervenor at 28, League of United
Latin Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (Nos. 90-
8014 & 90-9003) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111
S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
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minimize forum-shopping and the control of courts by small, tight-
knit special interest groups."'
The 'states' strongest objections to single-member districting
in judicial elections stem primarily from three concerns: (1) the
over-politicization of the judicial role;2s2 (2) the "balkanization" of
voter influence2 and (3) administrative entanglement. 4
Multimember districts in judicial elections serve several pur-
poses. First, they facilitate the administration of the judicial
system. In general, the drawing of judicial districts is based on
caseload rather than on population.25 Each judicial district is
assigned a certain number of judges based on need. Trial court
judges generally represent the entire district and judges work
in a pool, taking the cases they are assigned. Judges serve at-
large in order to compensate for varying caseloads and to allow
for the efficient administration of justice2 6 States have argued
that by forcing judicial districting according to population, section
2 would create "an administratively insoluble problem ' 7 of try-
ing to draw districts to give minority voters a "controlling say"
while protecting both administrative efficiency and judicial in-
dependence from political pressures?39
Second, multimember districts serve to insulate elected judges
from constituent pressure. In subdivided judicial districts, the
risks of overpoliticization are clear. The smaller the group a
judge serves, the greater the likelihood that constituents will
expect a judge to be responsive to their special needs. Danger
exists that the focus may move away from qualifications, integ-
rity, and experience and toward an attitude of "what can this
judge do for me. 2 40 When voters hold such an attitude, even the
231. Id.
232. See Brief for State Respondents at *21, Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen.,
111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991) (Nos. 90-813 & 90-974) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
233. See id. at *29.
234. See infra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
235. In part for this reason, courts have determined that the principle of one-person,
one-vote does not apply to judicial elections. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Gilligan, 349 F. Supp.
569, 571 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
236. ABA JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIv., STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION 19-20
(1990).
237. Supplemental Brief for Appellant Defendant-Intervenor at 29-30, League of United
Latin Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (Nos. 90-
8014 & 90-9003) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111
S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
238. Id. at 30.
239. Id. at 29-30 (citing Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285, 294 (N.D. La. 1988)).
240. See Katherine I. Butler, The Bench and the Ballot Box, FULTON Co. DAILY REP.,
Nov. 4, 1991, at 6-7.
1281
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
most conscientious judges may be tempted to bow to constituent
pressures. Multimember judicial districts can provide a buffer
that mitigates the accountability of each judge to a particular
constituent group.241 In single-member districting, however, that
buffer is destroyed.242
These hypothetical concerns might be outweighed if single-
member districting were guaranteed to enhance the interests of
minority voters. In all likelihood, single-member districts would
increase the number of minority members on state courts.243 The
purpose of the Voting Rights Act, however, is to protect minority
voters, not minority candidates.2 4 Lower courts will need to
determine whether, given the factual situation in each case,
single-member districting would serve the interests of minority
voters. Judicial elections differ from legislative, multimember
body elections in that a minority group with its chosen represen-
tatives sitting on a multimember body is reasonably assured that
its voice will be heard and its views represented in each decision
of the multimember body. In the case of trial judges, however,
minority litigants could expect to face judges they had no input
in electing.245 Consider, for example, a county that elects ten
judges and in which minorities constitute twenty percent of the
population. If districts were redrawn to allow greater minority
participation, minorities might be able to elect two judges of
their choice. An almost exclusive white majority, however, would
elect the remaining eight judges in the district.241 Such a district-
241. Id.
242. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana in Clark v.
Roemer stated that "[u]ndoubtably subdistricts could be drawn so small as to be an
unacceptable remedy." Clark v. Roemer, No. 86-435-A, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14322 at
*31 (M.D. La. Aug. 29, 1991). The court found, however, that the state interest against
subdistricting was not compelling because Louisiana had an existing judicial district with
an even lower population than the subdistricts proposed. Id. Similarly, in LULAC v.
Clements, Justice Johnson in his dissent noted that the proposed subdistricts were unlikely
to be smaller than some existing Texas judicial districts. League of United Latin Am.
Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 669 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Johnson,
J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom.'Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376
(1991).
243. See Coyle, supra note 191, at 1.
244. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 57 (1986).
245. According to Judge Higginbotham's concurrence in the Fifth Circuit's en banc
decision in LULAC, if a 59-judge district were subdivided, creating nine minority-
dominated districts, a litigant "would have a 98.3% chance of appearing before a judge
in whose election he had not been able to vote." LULAC, 914 F.2d at 650 (Higginbotham,
J., concurring). Furthermore, a minority litigant would have an 84.75% chance of appearing
before a judge who was from a nonminority district. Id.
246. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clements, 902 F.2d
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ing scheme could actually have a negative effect on the minority
population because "only a minute proportion of the judiciary
will be accountable to minority voters. '247
Alternative Remedies
Courts have stalled repeatedly at the remedy phase of section
2 challenges to judicial elections,248 largely because of the inherent
difficulties of subdividing judicial districts.29 Most courts have
deferred to state legislators to fashion a remedy, but thus far
only Mississippi has actually enacted a remedy for voter dilution
in judicial elections.25
Proponents of the application of section 2 to judicial elections,
however, have stressed that single-member subdistricting is not
the only existing remedy to voter dilution.251 One possibility is
"limited voting" in which each voter, rather than voting once for
each position, casts fewer votes than the number of vacancies to
be filled.252 Under limited voting, if five judgeships were up for
election, each voter might vote for only three.25 Such a scheme
would ameliorate the dilutive effects of at-large voting without
"balkanization. ' e4 At the same time, it makes each judge account-
able to every voter in the district.255
293, 307-08 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), and rev'd sub nom.
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991). This "balkanization"
effect is not unique to the judicial context. Drawing single-member districts to concentrate
minority votes makes the surrounding districts more white and more conservative. Such
redistricting is a boon to conservative, mainly Republican, political candidates. See, e.g.,
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Electing by Race, AM. LAW., June 1991, at 50.
247. Supplemental Brief for Appellant Defendant-Intervenor at 6, LULAC, 914 F.2d
620 (Nos. 90-8014 & 90-9003). The Fifth Circuit panel also advanced this argument. The
court noted that in Harris county, which includes Houston, minority voters would have
"an 84.75% chance of appearing before a judge who has no direct political interest in
being responsive to minority concerns." LULAC, 902 F.2d at 307-08; see LULAC, 914 F.2d
at 650 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
248. See Laura L. Woollcott, Note, State Judicial Elections and the Voting Rights Act:
Will Section 2 Protect Minority Voters?, 23 GA. L. REV. 787, 814 (1989).
249. See supra notes 230-47 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 16.
251. See, e.g., April D. Dulaney, Comment, A Judicial Exception for Judicial Elections:
"A Burning Scar on the Flesh of the Voting Rights Act," 65 TUL. L. REV. 1223, 1257-58
(1991).
252. Samuel Issacharoff, The 37.5 Percent Solution, TEX. LAW. 32, 32 (Mar. 5, 1990).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 33. Limited voting is currently in use in certain jurisdictions, among them
Pennsylvania. Id.
1283
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Limited voting, however, may have negative consequences
unanticipated by its proponents. Limited voting would, in effect,
ensure that any minority group able to organize a bloc vote could
elect candidates of its choice, even if those candidates could never
have been elected by a majority of the voters. One could well
imagine a situation in which this could work to the detriment of
racial minorities. Suppose, for example, that a community is
composed of a twenty percent racial minority and a twenty
percent racist minority. Under a limited voting scheme, the racist
minority would have as much opportunity to elect judges of its
choice as would the racial minority. As one commentator has
noted, alternatives to the majority vote "could well have the side
effect of opening the door to fringe candidates like racebaiting
former Klansman David Duke of Louisiana."?-6
A similar alternative remedy is "cumulative voting." Like
limited voting, cumulative voting preserves existing districts.
Cumulative voting differs only in that it allows voters to cast
several votes for a single vacancy. Under this plan, voters could
either concentrate their votes on a single candidate or allocate
them between desirable candidates.2 57 Like limited voting, cu-
mulative voting allows for increased minority success without
sacrificing judicial independence or at-large accountability. There-
fore, cumulative voting addresses the states' concern for judicial
independence and administrative efficiency.2  Like limited voting,
however, cumulative voting raises the spectre of other organized
interest groups seizing control of a fraction of the state judici-
ary.2 9 This concern alone should caution against heralding limited
and cumulative voting as panaceas for the contradictions inherent
in applying section 2 to judicial elections.
256. Taylor, spra note 246, at 50.
257. Knoebel, supra note 14, at 28. "Cumulative voting" is currently in use in elections
for certain local officials in Alamogordo, New Mexico, and in four Alabama counties:
Centre, Chilton, Guin, and Myrtlewood. Id.
258. Some commentators have also proposed appointment schemes as a possible alter-
native remedy for S 2 violations. See id. An attempt to switch to an appointive scheme
after courts had found a voting rights violation, however, would seem to violate § 5
preclearance requirements in states subject to S 5 and would likely be unacceptable in
other states as well. See id.; see generally Issachoroff, supra note 252, at 32 (arguing that
the Texas state legislature should adopt a system of limited voting for district court
elections). The Supreme Court decision in Chisom, however, suggested that states would
have the option of initiating a judicial appointment scheme. See supra note 218.
259. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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APPLYING SECTION 2 TO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Chisom v. Roem& 60
and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General261 answer only
one question: whether the results test of section 2 applies to
judicial elections.2 2 The most difficult questions, which involve
what standard should apply and how to administer a remedy,
are left for litigants to debate and subsequent courts to deter-
mine. Though the Supreme Court decided only the threshold
statutory question, it made clear that section 2 challenges to
judicial elections should be judged according to "the totality of
the circumstances test."26 The Court did not explore exactly how
to administer this test in the judicial context; it did, however,
offer some encouragement to state defendants. First, the Court
suggested that states have the option to abandon an electoral
scheme and to initiate a judicial appointment system.2 4 Second,
the Court opened the possibility that Thornburg v. Gingles265 may
not set the governing standard for section 2 violations in judicial
elections. 216 Third, the Court recognized that in balancing the
many factors in the totality of the circumstances test, the state
interest in districtwide judicial elections may, in some cases,
outweigh proof of racial voter dilution.27
The Change to an Appointment System
The Supreme Court's opinion in Chisom suggests that states
faced with section 2 challenges can refrain from compromising
their judiciary by changing from judicial elections to an appoint-
ment system.26 Justice Stevens noted that "Louisiana could, of
course, exclude its judiciary from the coverage of the Voting
Rights Act by changing to a system in which judges are ap-
pointed, and in that way, it could enable its judges to be indif-
ferent to popular opinion. ''2 9
260. 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
261. 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
262. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
263. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2368 (quoting 42 U.S.C. S 1973b (1988)).
264. Id. at 2367.
265. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
266. See infra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
267. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376, 2381 (1991).
268. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2367-68.
269. Id.
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Despite the Court's suggestion, any switch from electoral to
merit selection made in response to a section 2 challenge would
seem to implicate section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.20 Section
5 demands that states violating the Voting Rights Act either
seek a declaratory judgment from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia or have any changes in their
electoral process approved by the U.S. Attorney General.27 If
the Attorney General finds an attempt to institute appointment
selection to be against the interests of minority voters, he could
refuse approval and raise a section 5 challenge.2 7 2 Even a declar-
atory judgment or sanction from the Attorney General, however,
would not bar a subsequent challenge to the new electoral
scheme. 27 3 Therefore, changing to an appointment system may
not be a realistic alternative for those jurisdictions covered by
section 5.274
Applicability of the Gingles Criteria
The Supreme Court stated that its opinions in Chisom and
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n are "limited in character."275 The Court
did not purport to decide the elements of a section 2 claim in
judicial elections nor the appropriate remedy to administer.28 In
this regard, however, what the Supreme Court did not decide
may prove as significant as what it did decide. Noticeably absent
from the Court's two majority opinions is any indication that
Gingles should be the governing standard in section 2 challenges
to judicial elections. The Supreme Court has left the lower courts
the option of fashioning a new standard for section 2 challenges
to judicial elections.2 77
As discussed above, Gingles established the standard in section
2 claims for multimember districtwide elections.2 78 Gingles estab-
270. 42 U.S.C. S 1973c (1988).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Knoebel, supra note 14, at 28.
275. Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2361 (1991); see Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v.
Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376, 2380 (1991).
276. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2361.
277. The Court cites Gingles only twice in the Chisom majority opinion. One citation
simply supports the proposition that the one-person, one-vote rationale is not the essential
basis of a S 2 challenge. Id. at 2368 n.32. The second citation gives Gingles as one source
for the Court's interpretation of S 2's "totality of the circumstances" test. Id. at 2363
n.21. Interestingly, however, rather than citing Justice Brennan's majority opinion, the
Court cites Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
278. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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lished a three-pronged threshold burden that plaintiffs must meet
to state a section 2 claim.27 9 Once plaintiffs met this threshold
burden, the Court applied the totality of the circumstances test.28
In its application of this test, the Court determined that the two
most important factors to establish a section 2 violation were
the "'extent to which minority group members have been elected
to public office in the jurisdiction' and the 'extent to which voting
in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially
polarized.' "1 The Court stated in Gingles that the remaining
"Senate factors,' ' 2 2 if they existed, would support, but would not
be essential to, a section 2 challenge.m
Several commentators have criticized the Gingles criteria for
being overly intrusive even as applied to legislative elections.m
In the judicial context, however, the criteria could prove not only
overly intrusive but also misleading. The goal of section 2, as
expressed in the statute, is to outlaw election procedures that
make elections "not equally open to participation by members"
of protected minority groups.2a Courts are to determine whether
the electoral process is "equally open" by balancing "the totality
of the circumstances."' 68 This test, as originally devised by Con-
gress, is sufficiently fact-sensitive to weigh all of the policy
arguments against single-member districting in judicial elections,
including a balancing of what a given minority group will gain
and what it will lose by implementing such a remedy and the
costs to a state and its judicial system.28 No question exists that
a pure totality of the circumstances test is difficult to adminis-
ter.m Gingles facilitated its administration by highlighting elec-
279. These three criteria are: (1) that the minority group be "sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district"; (2) that the
minority group be politically cohesive; and (3) that the majority must vote "sufficiently
as a bloc to enable it. . .usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
280. Id. at 79-80.
281. Id. at 48 n.15 (quoting S. REP. No. 417, supra note 64, at 29, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07).
282. See supra note 80.
283. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-49 n.15.
284. See, e.g., THERNSTROM, supra note 83, at 205-09; see also Elizabeth McCaughey,
Perverting the Voting Rights Act, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1989, S 1 at 18 (arguing that the
courts and the Justice Department have transformed the Voting Rights Act into a system
of racial gerrymandering).
285. 42 U.S.C. 5 1973b (1988).
286. Id.
287. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 64, at 27-30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 204-08.
288. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CM. L.
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toral success and racial bloc voting as the essence of a voter
dilution claim.29 In the judicial context, however, the Gingles test
is too blunt a tool. A pure totality of the circumstances test, as
advocated by Justice O'Connor in her Gingles concurrence, is the
more appropriate measure for voter dilution in judicial elec-
tions.29o
Policy considerations support the proposition that judicial elec-
tions need not be judged under the same standard as legislative
elections. The judicial function differs significantly from the leg-
islative function. One principal difference is that judges should
not be overly responsive to their constituents.2 1 Another is that
judges, at least at the trial court level, do not make decisions as
a collegial body. In a legislative body, section 2 helps minority
voices be heard in the decisionmaking process, whereas in the
judicial context, section 2 may actually decrease a minority group's
overall influence on the judiciary.2 2 Courts must be able to weigh
these considerations in their decisionmaking.
Precedent also supports the position that judicial elections
should be subject to different standards than legislative elec-
tions.293 The long line of one-person, one-vote cases demonstrates
that courts have consistently recognized that judicial elections
raise different concerns than do legislative elections.2 4 Among
these is the fact that judges serve a different function than
legislators and that judicial districts are designed to facilitate
judicial administration rather than popular representation.25 Ad-
ministrative concerns alone would rarely, if ever, be pressing
enough to trump proof of racial voter dilution.2 6 These concerns,
REV. 1175 (1989) (advocating decisionmaking based on general principles rather than on
a weighing of the totality of the circumstances). Scalia notes, however, that, as in S 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, Congress can mandate that courts base their decision on the
totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1183.
289. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-49 (1986); see supra notes 279-83 and
accompanying text.
290. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 83-105. For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion, see supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 204-29 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., Voter Information Project v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d 208, 211-12
(1980) (upholding a cause of action for racial voter dilution in judicial elections despite
the difficulties highlighted by the one-person, one-vote line of cases). For a discussion of
the courts' refusal to apply the one-person, one-vote principle to judicial elections, see
supra notes 151-63.
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however, support devising a section 2 standard that is more
appropriate to judicial elections.
A Revised Threshold Standard
The Gingles three-part threshold test has aided courts in iden-
tifying the districts in which plaintiffs have raised a meritorious
section 2 challenge.297 The Gingles threshold test, therefore, should
be preserved to the extent that it works in the judicial context.
Of the three threshold factors, only the first, which demands that
plaintiffs demonstrate a minority group sufficiently large and
geographically compact to form a single-member district,298 re-
quires revision. Geographic compactness is an essential element
in determining voter dilution only when the remedy sought is
single-member redistricting.2 Although in some factual situa-
tions, single-member redistricting may be a feasible remedy for
section 2 violations in judicial elections, 0 policy concerns caution
against wholesale subdistricting in judicial elections.3 1
In place of geographic compactness, a revised threshold test
should require plaintiffs to show that in each challenged district
they have the "potential to elect [judges] in the absence of the
challenged structure or practice. °30 2 In cases in which the plain-
tiffs seek subdistricting, they would need to meet the Gingles
requirement of geographic compactness and a sufficiently large
minority population.303 In cases in which the plaintiffs seek alter-
native remedies such as limited or cumulative voting, they would
need to show that the remedies sought would actually provide
relief. This would require a sufficiently large minority population
to be able to elect judges under such an alternative scheme. Such
a revised threshold test would serve the same function as the
Gingles threshold test, that is, to identify meritorious claims, but
in addition would allow for consideration of alternative reme-
dies.304
297. See Shelley Wittevrongel, Case Note, Sanchez v. Bond, 110 S. Ct. 275 (1989):
Challenge to the Judicial Manageability of the Thornburg v. Gingles Threshold for Deter-
mining Minority Vote Dilution, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 127, 151-54 (1990).
298. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
299. For a discussion of alternative remedies to S 2 violations in judicial elections, see
supra notes 248-59 and accompanying text.
300. See generally Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (ordering the
adoption of single-member subdistricts for certain Mississippi judicial elections).
301. See supra notes 232-47 and accompanying text.
302. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17.
303. Id. at 50-51.
304. See id. at 50 n.17.
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The Totality of the Circumstances Test
After determining that plaintiffs have met their threshold
burden of proof, a court then determines, based on the totality
of the circumstances, whether illegal voter dilution has indeed.
occurred. The Senate Report that accompanied the 1982 Amend-
ment to section 2315 identified nine factors to be considered in an
application of the totality of the circumstances test to measure
racial vote dilution.306 The Court in Gingles chose to emphasize
two of these factors: the degree of minority candidates' electoral
success and the extent of racial bloc voting.307 In the case of
judicial elections, all factors Should be considered equally to
determine, based on a balancing test, whether members of a
minority group have "less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice."3 8 The state interest, which is
listed in the Senate factors as "whether the policy underlying
the state['s] . . . practice or procedure is tenuous,30 9 should be
one of the important factors a court considers in determining
whether illegal voter dilution has occurred.
Consideration of the state interest factor will also allow courts
to derive alternative remedies to single-member districting. Fea-
sible remedies might include cumulative or limited voting,3 10
despite potential abuses,31' or even the transition to a merit
selection system, depending on the facts of each claim. Courts
should have the flexibility to consider these alternative remedies
under a revised totality of the circumstances standard.
Racial Bloc Voting
Under the pure totality of the circumstances test, racial bloc
voting and electoral success would remain two of the many factors
courts consider in judging section 2 challenges. Courts should be
305. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 64, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 177.
306. For a list of the Senate factors, see supra note 80.
307. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated that,
"if difficulty in electing and white bloc voting are not proved, minority voters have not
established that the multimember structure interferes with their ability to elect their
preferred candidates." Id. at 49 n.15.
308. 42 U.S.C. S 1973b (1988).
309. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37 (quoting S. REP. No. 417, supra note 64, at 29, reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207).
310. See supra notes 248-59.
311. Id.
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sensitive to the differences between legislative and judicial elec-
tions in determining racial bloc voting and electoral success. In
judging racial bloc voting and electoral success in the case of
judicial elections, courts should focus their attention primarily
on whether judicial elections themselves are racially polarized.
In Chisom, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana determined that all elections are relevant
to an analysis of racial bloc voting but that the greater weight
of the inquiry should be on judicial elections. 3 12
This argument is persuasive, primarily because it factors into
the analysis a recognition of the difference in voter behavior in
judicial and legislative elections. Compared to legislative elec-
tions, judicial elections attract lower voter turnout, and much
less voter interest.313 Judicial elections are frequently uncontested
and incumbents hold an even greater advantage than they do in
legislative campaigns.314 Another peculiar aspect of judicial elec-
tions is that, when they are partisan, many judicial candidates
will be chosen by voters who cast a straight party ballot.3 15 This
is due primarily to the fact that judicial elections do not normally
attract great voter interest. Consequently, political affiliation
rather than race can be the best indicator of how a candidate
will fare. 16 Straight ticket voting can lead to cross-racial voting
and to mitigate against racially polarized elections. 317 Even when
312. Chisom v. Roemer, No. 86-4057, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816, at *13-14 (E.D. La.
Sept. 13, 1989), affd, 917 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1990), and rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
313. Id.
314. Id. at *14. Many states are able to convert electoral selection systems into a
pseudo-appointive system in practice by encouraging judges to retire midterm and
appointing favored candidates who in the next election will have the advantage of running
as incumbents. See COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 14, at 9; see also N. Houston Parks,
Judicial Selection - The Tennessee Experience, 7 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 615, 629 (1977)
(noting the prevalence in Tennessee of gubernatorial appointments despite the existence
of an electoral system).
315. Brief for the State Respondents at *8 & n.10, Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney
Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991) (Nos. 90-813 & 90-974) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
316. Id. at *9 n.11.
317. See Chisom, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816 at *43-44. The District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana found considerable cross-racial voting in judicial elections
in the First Supreme Court District of Louisiana. Id. at *37-38. The court found that
black judicial candidates actually stood a better chance of being elected than white judicial
candidates in the First District. The court also found that at least two. unsuccessful black
candidates had attempted to avoid publicity to keep their race a secret from voters. Id.
at *28-29. This was obviously not a successful campaign tactic. In addition, the court was
reluctant to take their defeat as an indication of racially polarized voting when those
candidates had not run openly as black candidates. As the court stated,
[t]he overall present reality in the Court's view is not a picture of racial
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straight party voting results in racial bloc voting, courts should
not find a section 2 violation if the evidence shows that voters
cast their ballots by party, irrespective and perhaps uninformed
of the race of the candidates.318
CONCLUSION
Section 2 is a garment that does not quite fit judicial elections.
In large part, however, the Gingles criteria rather than the
statute itself is incongruous with judicial elections. The present
interpretation of section 2 requires alteration to truly serve the
judicial context. Several factors support the position that despite
the applicability of section 2, a different, less intrusive standard
of proof should govern judicial elections. Many aspects of the
judicial function distinguish it from the function of legislators
and other elected officials. While the national government cannot
tolerate racial discrimination in any election, it need not apply
the Gingles criteria to the judicial context.
This Note suggests a revision of the Gingles standard for
judging section 2 challenges to judicial elections. Single-member
districting should not be the assumed remedy. The traditional
remedy of subdistricting along racial lines, if applied as a whole-
sale remedy, threatens to disrupt a balance between the inde-
pendence of the state judiciary from political pressures and the
accountability of the judiciary to the electorate. Courts can be
sensitive to these policy concerns in determining section 2 viol-
ations by revising the Gingles threshold test to allow for alter-
native remedies when appropriate and by supplanting the Gingles
criteria with a pure "totality of the circumstances test" that
would be more suitable to judicial elections. In this totality of
the circumstances test, the state interest in multimember dis-
tricts should be a major factor that courts weigh equally with
other factors to determine whether illegal voter dilution has
polarization to the detriment of the minority plaintiffs . . . but rather is an
emerging political process in Metropolitan New Orleans, wherein the talents
of black individuals as leaders in the judiciary and in other traditionally
political offices have been recognize [sic] by black and white voters.
Id. at *43-44.
318. The Tenth Circuit addressed this question in the context of a county commissioner
election. Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 340
(1990). An argument that straight party voting could 'reclude a finding of racial bloc
voting may be stronger in the judicial context in which voters are generally less informed
about the individual candidates. See COMIsKY & PATTERSON, supra note 14, at &9.
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occurred. In this way, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act will
continue to protect minority voters but will not destroy the
traditional function of the state judiciary.
Mary Thrower Wickham
